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My AccountChapter 15
- 15.1 General Comments on Criminal Attempt
- 15.2 Formulating the Elements of Attempt
- 15.3 Criteria for Determining Whether Defendant Went Far Enough
- 15.4 Impossibility
- 15.5 Defining Specific Intent to Commit Partially Strict Liability Offenses
- 15.6 Renunciation Defense to Guilt
- 15.7 Punishment Mitigation by Quasi-Renunciation
- 15.8 Instruction—Attempted Murder
- 15.9 Instruction—Attempted Murder—Affirmative Defense of Renunciation (Texas Penal Code Section 15.04(a))
- 15.10 Instruction—Attempted Murder—Punishment Mitigation by Quasi-Renunciation (Texas Penal Code Section 15.04(d))
- 15.11 Instruction—Attempted Burglary of a Building
- 15.12 Instruction—Attempted Burglary of a Building—Affirmative Defense of Renunciation (Texas Penal Code Section 15.04(a))
- 15.13 Instruction—Attempted Burglary of a Building—Punishment Mitigation by Quasi-Renunciation (Texas Penal Code Section 15.04(d))
- 15.14 Conspiracy Generally
- 15.15 Instruction—Liability for Conspiracy
- 15.16 Instruction—Liability for Conspiracy—Affirmative Defense of Renunciation (Texas Penal Code Section 15.04(b))
- 15.17 Instruction—Liability for Conspiracy—Punishment Mitigation by Quasi-Renunciation (Texas Penal Code Section 15.04(d))
- 15.18 Criminal Solicitation Generally
- 15.19 Instruction—Criminal Solicitation—Solicitation of Another to Personally Commit Offense
- 15.20 Comment on Solicitation of Another to Induce Someone Else to Commit Offense
- 15.21 Instruction—Criminal Solicitation—Solicitation of Another to Induce Third Party to Commit Offense
- 15.22 Instruction—Criminal Solicitation—Affirmative Defense of Renunciation (Texas Penal Code Section 15.04(b))
- 15.23 Instruction—Criminal Solicitation—Punishment Mitigation by Quasi-Renunciation (Texas Penal Code Section 15.04(d))
Comment
A limited but complete affirmative defense to a charge of attempt is provided for by Tex. Penal Code § 15.04(a). Two aspects are worth comment.
First, the defense requires proof that the intended target offense was not committed. Further, this must be as a result of the defendant’s renunciation of the effort to commit the target offense or some other “affirmative action” by the defendant.
Second, section 15.04(a) states the renunciation must be both “voluntary” and “complete.” Section 15.04(c) specifies when renunciation is not “voluntary.” The substance of section 15.04(c)’s criterion, however, would seem in part addressed to when renunciation is not “complete.” Section 15.04(c)(2) essentially provides that a renunciation is not effective when it is motivated in whole or part “by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another time or to transfer the criminal act to another but similar objective or victim.” Conceptually, this would seem to go not to whether the renunciation was “voluntary” but rather to whether it was “complete.”
The Committee believed it was not free to deviate from the statutory framework’s reliance on voluntariness, however, and the instruction therefore is phrased in section 15.04(c)(2)’s voluntary terminology.
The statute requires the abandonment be “under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal objective.” The Committee concluded the term manifesting was neither helpful nor necessary. It therefore rephrased the requirement in easier to understand terms.