Chapter 19
Criminal Homicide
19.2 Instruction—Murder—Knowingly or Intentionally
LAW SPECIFIC TO THIS CASE
The state accuses the defendant of having committed the offense of murder.
Relevant Statutes
A person commits the offense of murder if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual.
[Include the following if an instruction on causation is appropriate but no issue of concurrent causation is raised by the facts.]
A person causes the death of another if, but for the person’s conduct, the death of the other would not have occurred.
[Include the following if the facts raise an issue concerning concurrent causation.]
A person causes the death of another if, but for the person’s conduct operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, the death of the other would not have occurred, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the person was clearly insufficient.
Definitions
Intentionally Causing the Death of an Individual
A person intentionally causes the death of an individual if the person has the conscious objective or desire to cause that death.
Knowingly Causing the Death of an Individual
A person knowingly causes the death of an individual if the person is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that death.
Application of Law to Facts
You must determine whether the state has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, two elements. The elements are that—
- the defendant, in [county] County, Texas, on or about [date], caused the death of [name] [insert specific allegations, e.g., by shooting [name] with a gun]; and
- the defendant did this either intentionally or knowingly.
[Include the following if the jury was instructed in the relevant statutes unit on concurrent causation.]
The state has the burden of proving that the defendant caused the death of [name]. To prove that the defendant caused the death of [name], the state must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that either—
- [concurrent cause] did not contribute to causing the death of [name]; or
- [concurrent cause] was clearly insufficient, by itself, to cause the death of [name]; or
- the conduct of the defendant was clearly sufficient to cause the death of [name] regardless of [concurrent cause].
[Continue with the following.]
You must all agree on elements 1 and 2 of the offense of murder listed above.
If you all agree the state has failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, one or both of elements 1 and 2 listed above, you must find the defendant “not guilty.”
If you all agree the state has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, both of the two elements listed above, you must find the defendant “guilty.”
[Insert any other instructions raised by the evidence. Then continue with the verdict form found in CPJC 2.1, the general charge.]
Comment
Murder is prohibited by and defined in Tex. Penal Code § 19.02. The definitions of culpable mental states are derived from Tex. Penal Code § 6.03.
Several court of criminal appeals decisions suggest that a defendant acts with the culpable mental state required for this kind of murder if, with “a conscious disregard for life,” the defendant intentionally engages in high-risk activity such as initiating a gunfight with police officers. Blansett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 322, 325–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (relying on People v. Gilbert, 408 P.2d 365, 373 (Cal. 1965), rev’d on other grounds, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)); Dowden v. State, 758 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (reaffirming Blansett and holding that the defendant caused the officer’s death, even though the officer was shot by a fellow officer during gun battle occurring when defendants raided a jail facility to free a prisoner).
Blansett and Dowden were sufficiency-of-the-evidence cases. Apparently no effort has been made to incorporate what might be their “holding” into jury instructions permitting conviction for intentional murder on a theory of intentionally engaging in activity involving a high risk to human life. The Committee was not certain about the current significance of these decisions but concluded that they should not be incorporated into jury instructions on intentional murder.