Chapter 42
Disorderly Conduct and Related Offenses
42.41 Instruction—Felony Cruelty to Nonlivestock Animal—Administering Poison without Effective Consent
LAW SPECIFIC TO THIS CASE
The state accuses the defendant of having committed the offense of cruelty to nonlivestock animals.
Relevant Statutes
A person commits an offense if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, without the owner’s effective consent, administers poison to an animal.
Conduct coming within the definition of this offense is not a crime if the conduct constituting the offense is either—
- a generally accepted and otherwise lawful form of conduct
occurring solely for the purpose of or in support of—
- fishing, hunting, or trapping; or
- wildlife management, wildlife or depredation control, or shooting preserve practices as regulated by state and federal law; or
- a generally accepted and otherwise lawful animal husbandry or agriculture practice involving livestock animals.
Definitions
Animal
“Animal” means a domesticated living creature, including any stray or feral cat or dog, and a wild living creature previously captured. The term does not include an uncaptured wild living creature or a livestock animal.
Consent
“Consent” means assent in fact, whether express or apparent.
Effective Consent
[Include relevant parts of definition as raised by the evidence.]
“Effective consent” includes consent by a person legally authorized to act for the owner. Consent is not effective if it is—
- induced by force, threat, or fraud;
- given by a person the actor knows is not legally authorized to act for the owner;
- given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect, or intoxication is known by the actor to be unable to make reasonable decisions; or
- given solely to detect the commission of an offense.
Intentionally Administering a Substance to an Animal
A person intentionally administers a substance to an animal if it is the person's conscious objective or desire to administer it to the animal.
Knowingly Administering a Substance to an Animal
A person knowingly administers a substance to an animal if the person is aware that the person is administering it to the animal.
Knowing a Substance Is Poison
A person knows a substance is poison if the person is aware that it is poison.
Reckless that a Substance Is Poison
A person is reckless about whether a substance is poison if the person is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the substance is poison. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint.
Knowledge about Not Having the Owner’s Effective Consent
A person knows that he does not have the owner’s effective consent if the person is aware that he does not have the owner’s effective consent.
Reckless about Not Having the Owner’s Effective Consent
A person is reckless about not having the owner’s effective consent if the person is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person does not have the owner’s effective consent. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint.
Application of Law to Facts
You must determine whether the state has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, eight elements. The elements are that—
- in [county] County, Texas, on or about [date], the defendant administered a substance to [insert specifics, e.g., Dog # 1];
- the defendant did so intentionally or knowingly;
- the defendant knew or was reckless about whether it was poison;
- [insert specifics, e.g., Dog # 1] was an animal;
- [insert specifics, e.g., Dog # 1] was owned by [name of owner];
- the defendant did not have the effective consent of [name of owner] to administer the poison;
- the defendant knew [he/she] did not have or was reckless about not having the consent of [name of owner]; and
- the conduct constituting the offense was neither—
- a
generally accepted and otherwise lawful form of conduct occurring
solely for the purpose of or in support of—
- fishing, hunting, or trapping; or
- wildlife management, wildlife or depredation control, or shooting preserve practices as regulated by state and federal law; nor
- a generally accepted and otherwise lawful animal husbandry or agriculture practice involving livestock animals.
- a
generally accepted and otherwise lawful form of conduct occurring
solely for the purpose of or in support of—
You must all agree on all of the elements above.
If you all agree the state has failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, one or more of the elements listed above, you must find the defendant “not guilty.”
If you all agree the state has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, each of the eight elements listed above, you must [find the defendant “guilty”/next consider whether the defendant is not guilty because of the defense of [insert defense, e.g., bona fide experimentation for scientific research]].
[Insert any other instructions raised by the evidence. Then continue with the verdict form found in CPJC 2.1, the general charge.]
Comment
The Penal Code provides no definition of “poison,” nor is a definition generally recommended. The Committee debated whether administering poison is a nature-of-conduct or result-of-conduct offense. On the one hand, the legislature chose to make the bad act the administering of poison, not “poisoning” or “causing an animal to be poisoned,” which might lean toward a conclusion the offense is a nature of conduct. On the other hand, administering poison implies a result—that the poison was administered.
Yet, the concepts of the verb “to administer” (which suggests nature of conduct) and the noun “poison” (which suggests circumstance) seem separable, and separating them may more closely respect the intention of the legislature based on the grammatical structure of the statute and existing rules and the mental state definitions. The plain language of “administer” seems to require direct application to the animal, and recklessness does not fit naturally with that concept. But the application of recklessness to “poison” as a circumstance of the offense seems easy and clear. The Committee thus decided to offer mens rea definitions that separate out the two concepts. This approach seems to respect the decision of the legislature in this offense to include recklessness as a culpable mental state while also honoring its definitions of the culpable mental states and its restriction of their applications.