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Chapter 42

Chapter 42

Disorderly Conduct and Related Offenses

42.8  Stalking Generally

Comment

The offense of stalking under Tex. Penal Code § 42.072 is a complicated crime containing several elements defined so as to permit the state to prove any of several alternatives. This makes the drafting of an instruction appropriate for use in all cases difficult.

Almost all of the statutory alternatives are provided for in the instruction that follows. The Committee intends that the instruction be edited for use in particular cases, setting out only those alternatives pled in the charging instrument and supported by the evidence. As a result, an edited instruction for a particular case should be considerably shorter than the one at CPJC 42.9.

Incorporation of Harassment. The first element of stalking can be established by proof that the defendant’s conduct constituted the offense of harassment as prohibited by Tex. Penal Code § 42.07. Harassment, itself, is a complicated crime, so a stalking instruction incorporating harassment becomes particularly complex. Accordingly, the Committee did not provide for this in the instruction because of the complexity it would create and the infrequency with which this manner of committing stalking is likely to be alleged.

Definition of “Should Know.” One element of stalking requires proof that the defendant knew or “reasonably should [have known]” that the other person would regard the defendant’s conduct as threatening certain specified consequences. The Committee had some uncertainty as to the meaning of “reasonably should have known.”

This might have been intended to incorporate an ordinary negligence standard as is used in many forms of civil liability. If this was the case, the Penal Code contains no definition of the standard.

The Committee concluded that the legislature must have meant to incorporate into stalking the standard of criminal negligence as defined by Tex. Penal Code § 6.03(d). Generally, Tex. Penal Code § 6.02(a) indicates that “civil” negligence is not a part of the scheme for defining criminal liability. Given this careful provision for and definition of criminal negligence, any legislative intention to use ordinary negligence would be more explicitly expressed.

Consequently, the definition offered by the Committee applies to this element the definition of criminal negligence contained in section 6.03(d).