71.5 Defining “Collaborate
in Carrying on Criminal Activities”
Comment
In Nava v. State, 379
S.W.3d 396, 421–22 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012), aff’d, 415
S.W.3d 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (review granted on
other issues), the trial judge included in the instructions a definition
of the term collaborate in carrying on criminal activities as
it is used in Texas Penal Code section 71.01(a)’s definition of “combination.”
The term was defined for the jury as “working together with a specified
number of others in specified criminal activities.” Nava claimed
error in giving this definition over the one sought by the defense,
which would have defined the term as “to ‘work together in a continuing
course of criminal activities.’ ”
Any definition, Nava concluded, should make
clear that the required corroboration must involve an intention
in at least one criminal activity other than the covered offense
specified in the state’s claim. But it should not suggest the members
of the claimed combination intended to indefinitely engage in criminal
activities. The instruction actually given, the court commented,
failed to adequately convey that the collaboration must be to engage
in continuing criminal activity.
Nava also concluded that “‘collaborate in
carrying on’ is not a phrase which has acquired a technical legal
meaning that must be provided to the jury.” Nava, 379 S.W.3d
at 421–22.
The Committee agreed with Nava that no definition
is required. It further concluded any definition is more likely
to confuse jurors than help them. Thus the Committee’s instructions
contain no definition.
Comment
In Nava v. State, 379 S.W.3d 396, 421–22 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012), aff’d, 415 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (review granted on other issues), the trial judge included in the instructions a definition of the term collaborate in carrying on criminal activities as it is used in Texas Penal Code section 71.01(a)’s definition of “combination.” The term was defined for the jury as “working together with a specified number of others in specified criminal activities.” Nava claimed error in giving this definition over the one sought by the defense, which would have defined the term as “to ‘work together in a continuing course of criminal activities.’ ”
Any definition, Nava concluded, should make clear that the required corroboration must involve an intention in at least one criminal activity other than the covered offense specified in the state’s claim. But it should not suggest the members of the claimed combination intended to indefinitely engage in criminal activities. The instruction actually given, the court commented, failed to adequately convey that the collaboration must be to engage in continuing criminal activity.
Nava also concluded that “‘collaborate in carrying on’ is not a phrase which has acquired a technical legal meaning that must be provided to the jury.” Nava, 379 S.W.3d at 421–22.
The Committee agreed with Nava that no definition is required. It further concluded any definition is more likely to confuse jurors than help them. Thus the Committee’s instructions contain no definition.