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My AccountChapter 8
- 8.1 Categorizing Defenses
- 8.2 Burdens of Proof and Production under Texas Penal Code Chapter 2
- 8.3 Explaining to Jury State’s Burden of Proof on Defenses
- 8.4 Nonstatutory Defensive Positions and Jury Instructions
- 8.5 Instructions on Inconsistent Defenses
- 8.6 “Confession and Avoidance”: Need to Admit Offense
- 8.7 Failure to Instruct on Defense Cannot Be “Fundamental” Error
- 8.8 Defendant’s Right to Have No Instruction on Defense
- 8.9 Relationship of Necessity to Other Defensive Positions
- 8.10 Insanity Generally
- 8.11 Consequences of Insanity Acquittal
- 8.12 Defining “Wrong”
- 8.13 Defining “Severe Mental Disease or Defect”
- 8.14 Instruction—Insanity
- 8.15 Diminished Capacity Generally
- 8.16 Basic Framework for Mistake of Fact under Texas Law
- 8.17 Pre-1974 Texas Mistake-of-Fact Law
- 8.18 Other Jurisdictions and Potential Constitutional Problem
- 8.19 Possible Alternative Approach—Two Mistake-of-Fact Defenses
- 8.20 Reasonableness of Mistake as Matter for Court Rather Than Jury
- 8.21 Committee’s Approach
- 8.22 Instruction—Mistake of Fact
- 8.23 Texas Penal Code Distinction between Mistakes of “Fact” and Mistakes of “Law”
- 8.24 Instruction—Mistake of Law
- 8.25 Voluntary Intoxication Generally
- 8.26 Instruction—Voluntary Intoxication
- 8.27 Involuntary Intoxication Generally
- 8.28 The Committee’s Approach to Involuntary Intoxication
- 8.29 Instruction—Involuntary Intoxication
- 8.30 General Law of Duress
- 8.31 Instruction—Duress (Felony)
- 8.32 Instruction—Duress (Misdemeanor)
- 8.33 Entrapment Generally
- 8.34 Status of “Informers”
- 8.35 Instruction—Entrapment
Comment
The Committee considered whether the instruction on insanity should go beyond the language of the Texas Penal Code provision and define what is meant by “wrong.”
An ongoing debate in criminal law generally is whether “wrong” as used in insanity formulations such as that in Penal Code section 8.01(a) does or should mean “legal” wrong or rather “legal or moral” wrong. The court of criminal appeals has clearly stated that “[u]nder Texas law, ‘wrong’ in this context means ‘illegal.’ ” Ruffin v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (relying on Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)). Some members of the Committee questioned whether, despite this language in the opinions, the meaning of “wrong” has in fact been definitively and fairly resolved as a matter of Texas law.
In any case, the court of criminal appeals has held that section 8.01 is not unconstitutional because it fails to define “wrong” (or “know”). In the course of the discussion, the court suggested that this was in part because “wrong” needs no definition in jury instructions:
[A]ppellant contends that Texas Penal Code section 8.01 is unconstitutional because it does not define the words “know” and “wrong.” He claims that the result is the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.
There is no error in omitting the definition of a word used in the statute when the word is used in its ordinary sense and is easily comprehended by everyone. If there is no statutory definition of a term, the trial court is not obligated to define the term when it “has such a common and ordinary meaning that jurors can be fairly presumed to know and apply such meaning.” Likewise, when the terms used are simple in themselves and are used in their ordinary meaning, such as they are in this case, jurors are supposed to know their meaning, and therefore, a definition in the jury charge is not necessary. The terms “know” and “wrong,” though not defined in the statute, are common and easily comprehended. Appellant’s . . . point of error is overruled.
Resendiz v. State, 112 S.W.3d 541, 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citations omitted). Resendiz does not, of course, definitely hold that an instruction defining “wrong” would be legally inaccurate or even inappropriate.
Nevertheless, the Committee was persuaded that the ongoing disagreements and the flavor of Resendiz meant that the Committee should not recommend going beyond existing practice of instructing the jury in the statutory language with “wrong” undefined. See, e.g., Bartel v. State, No. 02-16-00020-CR, 2017 WL 1089689 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 23, 2017, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (although it was not disputed that defendant suffered from a severe mental illness that caused him to believe his conduct was morally right, jury heard evidence that he knew his conduct was proscribed by law at the time of the offense, which was legally and factually sufficient to support its rejection of defendant’s affirmative defense of insanity).