8.7 Failure
to Instruct on Defense Cannot Be “Fundamental” Error
Comment
Under article 36.19 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure, as construed in Almanza
v. State, 686
S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), error in the jury
instructions is sometimes “fundamental.” This means reversal of
a conviction is required even if the defendant failed to preserve
the error in the trial court by objection or request for special
instructions. In fact, reversal is required even if the defendant,
after reviewing the proposed instructions, affirmatively announced
that the defense had no objection. Bluitt
v. State, 137
S.W.3d 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
A trial judge has the obligation to instruct the jury, without
a request from either party, regarding only “the law applicable
to the case.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.14.
At least some defensive matters are not “law applicable to the case.”
Therefore a trial court’s failure to instruct on these defensive
matters cannot give rise to fundamental error under Almanza. Posey v. State, 966
S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (any unpreserved
error in failing to instruct on mistake of fact cannot be fundamental error
under Almanza). See also Bennett v. State, 235
S.W.3d 241, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (defense of third
person was defensive matter and trial court’s failure to instruct on
it could not be fundamental error under Posey); Delgado v. State, 235
S.W.3d 244, 249–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (instruction
on state’s burden of proof on extraneous offenses was not required
by Almanza).
Fundamental error under Almanza nevertheless
has some impact in the context of defensive matters. If, without
a defense request, a trial judge gives an instruction on a defensive
matter, error in the substance of that instruction can be fundamental. Barrera v. State, 982
S.W.2d 415, 416–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
Comment
Under article 36.19 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, as construed in Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), error in the jury instructions is sometimes “fundamental.” This means reversal of a conviction is required even if the defendant failed to preserve the error in the trial court by objection or request for special instructions. In fact, reversal is required even if the defendant, after reviewing the proposed instructions, affirmatively announced that the defense had no objection. Bluitt v. State, 137 S.W.3d 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
A trial judge has the obligation to instruct the jury, without a request from either party, regarding only “the law applicable to the case.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.14. At least some defensive matters are not “law applicable to the case.” Therefore a trial court’s failure to instruct on these defensive matters cannot give rise to fundamental error under Almanza. Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (any unpreserved error in failing to instruct on mistake of fact cannot be fundamental error under Almanza). See also Bennett v. State, 235 S.W.3d 241, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (defense of third person was defensive matter and trial court’s failure to instruct on it could not be fundamental error under Posey); Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 249–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (instruction on state’s burden of proof on extraneous offenses was not required by Almanza).
Fundamental error under Almanza nevertheless has some impact in the context of defensive matters. If, without a defense request, a trial judge gives an instruction on a defensive matter, error in the substance of that instruction can be fundamental. Barrera v. State, 982 S.W.2d 415, 416–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).