Under Texas Penal Code section 9.41(a), the
right to defend “one’s own” land is a right to defend it against
another’s “trespass.” Trespass is not defined in the Penal Code,
except insofar as it might incorporate “criminal trespass” as defined
in section 30.05.
Given that section 9.41 does not use the term criminal
trespass, it may be intended to mean trespass as it is
defined for civil law purposes:
Trespass to real property occurs
when a person enters another’s land without consent. . . . Concerning
the intent element of the tort, . . . the only relevant intent is
that of the actor to enter the property. The actor’s subjective intent
or awareness of the property’s ownership is irrelevant. [S]ee,
e.g., McDaniel Bros. v.
Wilson, 70
S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1934, writ
ref’d) (holding that “every unauthorized entry upon land of another
is a trespass” even if no damage is done and “the intent or motive prompting
the trespass is immaterial”).
“Land” is not defined. “The plain meaning of ‘land’ is ‘the
solid part of the surface of the earth.’ ” Tarlton v. State, 93
S.W.3d 168, 174 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002,
pet. ref’d) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1268
(1993)). Nevertheless, Texas courts have assumed—without careful
consideration—that section 9.41(a) creates a right to defend the
habitation. E.g., Rogers v. State, 653
S.W.2d 122, 124 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983,
pet. ref’d) (“[T]he right to a charge on defense of habitation is
governed by Penal Code § 9.41 and § 9.42.”). A defendant charged
with assault was entitled to this instruction when evidence showed
that he asked the complainant, a guest in his apartment, to leave,
and when she refused, he pushed her out of the door. Manzke v. State, No. 05-02-00356-CR,
2003 WL 1870560, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 14, 2003, no pet.)
(not designated for publication).
Comment
Under Texas Penal Code section 9.41(a), the right to defend “one’s own” land is a right to defend it against another’s “trespass.” Trespass is not defined in the Penal Code, except insofar as it might incorporate “criminal trespass” as defined in section 30.05.
Given that section 9.41 does not use the term criminal trespass, it may be intended to mean trespass as it is defined for civil law purposes:
Trespass to real property occurs when a person enters another’s land without consent. . . . Concerning the intent element of the tort, . . . the only relevant intent is that of the actor to enter the property. The actor’s subjective intent or awareness of the property’s ownership is irrelevant. [S]ee, e.g., McDaniel Bros. v. Wilson, 70 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1934, writ ref’d) (holding that “every unauthorized entry upon land of another is a trespass” even if no damage is done and “the intent or motive prompting the trespass is immaterial”).
Wilen v. Falkenstein, 191 S.W.3d 791, 797–98 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied) (some citations omitted).
“Land” is not defined. “The plain meaning of ‘land’ is ‘the solid part of the surface of the earth.’ ” Tarlton v. State, 93 S.W.3d 168, 174 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1268 (1993)). Nevertheless, Texas courts have assumed—without careful consideration—that section 9.41(a) creates a right to defend the habitation. E.g., Rogers v. State, 653 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, pet. ref’d) (“[T]he right to a charge on defense of habitation is governed by Penal Code § 9.41 and § 9.42.”). A defendant charged with assault was entitled to this instruction when evidence showed that he asked the complainant, a guest in his apartment, to leave, and when she refused, he pushed her out of the door. Manzke v. State, No. 05-02-00356-CR, 2003 WL 1870560, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 14, 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication).