Traditional Texas self-defense case law contains
considerable discussion concerning the need for, or at least the
permissibility of, what are often labeled “converse” instructions.
Early cases often involved instructions on “provoking the difficulty.” When
this was covered by the instructions, the case law made clear, it
was appropriate for the instructions to also address the converse—that
is, that the defendant was entitled to prevail on self-defense if
the issue of “provoking the difficulty” was resolved in favor of
the defendant. E.g., Flewellen
v. State, 204
S.W. 657, 660–61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1917). “It is well
settled that where the court instructs the jury on the effect of
provoking a difficulty it should also instruct on the converse of
the proposition and the instructions on the converse should be given
from the defendant’s viewpoint untrammeled by any extra burden or
insinuation.” Dirck v. State, 579
S.W.2d 198, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (opinion on rehearing)
(citation omitted).
Other cases, however, used the term in a different manner,
that is, in contexts involving no provocation-related issues. These
decisions involved instructions properly telling juries that the
state had the burden of proving self-defense inapplicable. They
declined to disapprove a following converse instruction that told
juries that if the state met its burden, the juries should find
against the defendants on the issue of self-defense. See Whitaker v. State, 174
S.W.2d 975, 976 (Tex. Crim. App. 1943) (no harm was
caused to defendant by converse instruction telling jury to find
against defendant on his issue of self-defense if it found beyond
a reasonable doubt that defendant did not reasonably believe he
was in danger of death or serious bodily harm from deceased).
Such a converse instruction provides as follows:
If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
that at the time and place in question the defendant did not reasonably
believe that he was in danger of death or serious bodily injury,
. . . or that defendant, under the circumstances, did not reasonably
believe that the degree of force actually used by him was immediately
necessary to protect himself against [the victim’s] use or attempted
use of unlawfully deadly force, if any as viewed from defendant’s
standpoint, at the time, then you must find against the defendant
on the issue of self defense.
The Dallas court of appeals in 1999 appeared sympathetic to
a defendant’s argument that a converse instruction of the second
type is an “anachronism in Texas law” that violates the spirit of
the prohibition against comment on the evidence. Nevertheless, it
held that it was bound to precedent establishing that the giving
of such a converse instruction is not a basis for reversing a conviction. Aldana v. State, No. 05-98-00135-CR,
1999 WL 357355, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 4, 1999, pet. ref’d) (not
designated for publication) (relying on Powers
v. State, 396
S.W.2d 389, 391–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965)).
The Committee concluded that if jury instructions on self-defense
are properly crafted, so-called converse instructions are neither
necessary nor desirable. Thus the instruction at CPJC 9.10 does not
include them.
Comment
Traditional Texas self-defense case law contains considerable discussion concerning the need for, or at least the permissibility of, what are often labeled “converse” instructions. Early cases often involved instructions on “provoking the difficulty.” When this was covered by the instructions, the case law made clear, it was appropriate for the instructions to also address the converse—that is, that the defendant was entitled to prevail on self-defense if the issue of “provoking the difficulty” was resolved in favor of the defendant. E.g., Flewellen v. State, 204 S.W. 657, 660–61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1917). “It is well settled that where the court instructs the jury on the effect of provoking a difficulty it should also instruct on the converse of the proposition and the instructions on the converse should be given from the defendant’s viewpoint untrammeled by any extra burden or insinuation.” Dirck v. State, 579 S.W.2d 198, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (opinion on rehearing) (citation omitted).
Other cases, however, used the term in a different manner, that is, in contexts involving no provocation-related issues. These decisions involved instructions properly telling juries that the state had the burden of proving self-defense inapplicable. They declined to disapprove a following converse instruction that told juries that if the state met its burden, the juries should find against the defendants on the issue of self-defense. See Whitaker v. State, 174 S.W.2d 975, 976 (Tex. Crim. App. 1943) (no harm was caused to defendant by converse instruction telling jury to find against defendant on his issue of self-defense if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not reasonably believe he was in danger of death or serious bodily harm from deceased).
Such a converse instruction provides as follows:
If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time and place in question the defendant did not reasonably believe that he was in danger of death or serious bodily injury, . . . or that defendant, under the circumstances, did not reasonably believe that the degree of force actually used by him was immediately necessary to protect himself against [the victim’s] use or attempted use of unlawfully deadly force, if any as viewed from defendant’s standpoint, at the time, then you must find against the defendant on the issue of self defense.
Gonzales v. State, 762 S.W.2d 583, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
The Dallas court of appeals in 1999 appeared sympathetic to a defendant’s argument that a converse instruction of the second type is an “anachronism in Texas law” that violates the spirit of the prohibition against comment on the evidence. Nevertheless, it held that it was bound to precedent establishing that the giving of such a converse instruction is not a basis for reversing a conviction. Aldana v. State, No. 05-98-00135-CR, 1999 WL 357355, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 4, 1999, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (relying on Powers v. State, 396 S.W.2d 389, 391–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965)).
The Committee concluded that if jury instructions on self-defense are properly crafted, so-called converse instructions are neither necessary nor desirable. Thus the instruction at CPJC 9.10 does not include them.